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ture students the familiar and time-honored categories of origin and development, organization and functioning, continuity and change should be followed. Perhaps the less obtrusive we make our methodology in teaching social science, the better we shall succeed!

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Dynamic Psychology. ROBERT SESSIONS WOODWORTH. New York: Columbia University Press. 1918. Pp. 210.

This book will have a wide popular appeal on account of its interesting style, and because it brings together in popular form some important recent developments in psychological literature. It is admirably suited for general readers, as well as for supplementary reading in elementary courses. However, the author's facile style, and the fact that he holds the reader's attention from the first page to the last, should not cause the fact to be overlooked that Professor Woodworth advocates several new conceptions and methods that challenge the consideration of psychologists, especially of social psychologists.

The opening chapter is a brief historical sketch of "the modern movement in psychology," indicating the sources and motives—epistemological, physiological, comparative, anthropological, linguistic, pathological, pedagogical, and industrial—that have given rise to the modern science. Otherwise comprehensive as a short survey, the author fails to notice, here or elsewhere in the book, the work that has been done in the psychology of religion. The second chapter evaluates the methods of those who conceive psychology as the "science of consciousness" and as the "science of behavior." The former are credited with "considerable progress" in the study of sensations, "good work" with mental imagery, and "suggestive beginnings" in a description of the conscious process of thinking. Regarding "behaviorism" the author remarks, "though few had given expression to this view of psychology when attempting to define it, a large share of all the experimental work from the time of Fechner down is virtually work on human behavior, and only incidentally, if at all, on consciousness" (p. 31). This holds true, not only of work on reaction time and on animals, but also of most studies of memory and practise, individual differences, heredity, mental development, and abnormal conditions. A mere union of the methods of "consciousness" and "behavior" would not provide a coherent system of processes for causal treatment, and so "dynamic psychology" must combine the results of the two with those of brain physiology, "working always toward a clearer view of the mental side of vital activity" and "an understanding of the complete processes of mental activity and development" (pp. 35, ff.). The third chapter, dealing with "the native equipment of man," is chiefly novel for adding to reflexes, instincts, and other usually recognized propensities, what the author calls "innate capacities." The latter, which are adaptations to more special features of the environment than instincts, serve to account for differences of natural capacity for diverse vocations and other activities. The fourth chapter summarizes recent investigations into the manner in which the "acquired or learned equipment" of man is added to the native equipment. The following two chapters, under the captions "Selection and Control" and the "Factor of Originality" show how, in the development of knowledge and character, selection is made between possible modes of reaction, and originality in reasoning and willing appear. Illuminating interpretations of "abnormal behavior" and "social behavior" from the point of view of "dynamic psychology" conclude the book.

The chief working distinction in "dynamic psychology" is that between "mechanism" and "drive." In a machine, "drive" is the motive power applied to make the "mechanism" go. Human and animal behavior, of course, are more complicated, and a variety of "preparatory reactions" characterized by a "persistent inner tendency" may lead toward the "consummatory reaction," as illustrated by a hunting dog in search of a lost trail, who is not "simply carried along from one detail to another by a succession of stimuli calling out simple reflexes," but is "driven along by some internal force" (p. 41). The mechanism for the consummatory reaction of capturing the game, once it is set into activity by a suitable stimulus, "acts as a 'drive' operating other mechanisms giving the preparatory reactions." "Drives" and "mechanisms" are not essentially different; "any mechanism might be a drive" (p. 42), and "every drive is also a mechanism" (p. 126). Though by no means a disciple of Loeb or Watson, Professor Woodworth seems to have decidedly mechanistic inclinations; in fact, he goes so far as to compare the human mind with a large manufacturing plant, stocked with all sorts of mechanisms, some useful, and others grown stiff and rusty with disuse (pp. 105, ff.).

In his exposition of "dynamic psychology" the more novel and distinguishing features are usually stated in contrast to the positions of the *Social Psychology* of William McDougall. The latter derives nearly all human conduct from the ''principal primary instincts'' (flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-assertion, submission, parental, food-seeking, sex, gregariousness, constructiveness) with their attendant emotions, and the ''non-specific innate tendencies'' (imitation, sympathy, suggestion, play). Professor Woodworth apparently would accept all or most of these as genuinely innate tendencies (''innate mechanisms'' in his own terminology), but he contends that in addition there exist other ''innate mechanisms'' which he calls ''native capacities,'' *i. e.*, aptitudes or gifts for certain activities, or for dealing with certain classes of things, as ''when we speak of one person having a natural gift for music, another for mathematics, another for mechanics, and another for salesmanship'' (p. 59). Conduct may be initiated by any ''innate mechanism'' whatever. ''The great aim of the book is, that is to say, to attempt to show that any mechanism—except perhaps some of the most rudimentary that give the simple reflexes—once it is aroused, is capable of furnishing its own drive and of lending drive to other connected mechanisms'' (p. 67).

The author's arguments for this doctrine of ''innate mechanisms'' in opposition to McDougall's simpler method of deriving all conduct from instinctive tendencies are principally three. (1) McDougall assumes that persons are with difficulty aroused to activity, so that ''powerful'' impulses are requisite, whereas the opposite is the truth, as is clearly evident in the case of young children, who alone are limited to native propensities. (2) Children are absorbed in any subject-matter for which they have native gifts, and their interest is not held where this is not the case. (3) McDougall's view implies that in order to secure action it is always necessary to appeal to extraneous motives (instincts) and not to interest in the activity itself. This is bad pedagogy and bad ethics. It implies that teachers and employers must appeal exclusively to extraneous motives, and not to love of the work itself.

The first two arguments, so far as they do not beg the question, appear to be involved in the third, and likewise to assume that to appeal to an instinct is usually to appeal to an extraneous motive. Now why does Professor Woodworth believe this to be the case? I suggest two explanations. (1) He has regarded McDougall's ''instincts'' as a species of his own ''mechanisms,'' which latter are structural units like the pieces of machinery in a factory. This certainly is not the notion of an ''instinct'' held by McDougall, who speaks of ''instincts'' as ''tendencies,'' ''dispositions,'' ''functional units'' (*Social Psychology*): who says that they may be regarded as differentiations of a ''will to live'' or *élan vital* (*British Journal of*

Psychology, Vol. III., p. 258), and who in *Body and Mind* describes an instinct as in part purely psychical and without physical correlate (Chap. XIX., especially the reference to "curiosity," pp. 266, ff.). (2) Professor Woodworth, perhaps in consequence of his mechanistic leanings, overlooks the fact that for McDougall many native stimuli and modes of reaction may become suppressed and others be acquired, and that the latter then are integral parts of the instinct. He also fails to appreciate the importance in McDougall's system of the "sentiments." As a concrete illustration, let us take Professor Woodworth's instance of a child induced to study singing by appeals to his self-feeling. Such a child, he contends, unless he had a natural musical gift, would soon drop out and parry the appeal to his self-feeling by deriding singing and those children who excel him (pp. 67, ff.). No doubt this is true. (This, by the way, is a fortunate illustration for the author, as a native gift for pitch discrimination probably is a prerequisite for learning to sing.) But suppose that the child proved to have this native gift and learned to sing. Should we have to say that his further progress in singing would be due to gratification of this native gift, while his self-feeling would ever remain an extraneous motive? On the contrary, it seems to me that singing might become integrally attached to self-feeling in his case and become a characteristic mode for its expression. We may go on to imagine the child becoming so absorbed in singing that a sentiment develops, and that this sentiment (love of singing) receives the support of most, or all, of his other instinctive emotions, as well as of the numerous and novel complex emotions which the sentiment brings into existence. Ultimately, it may be, singing becomes the master passion of his life, and nothing else can rival his art as the most important constituent of his self; in regard to nothing else have his self-feelings become so sensitive to stimulation, or so violent in reaction. Similarly, Gaus's extreme absorption in mathematical work, "due to nothing else in the world but his interest in what he was doing" (p. 200), could no doubt, if we studied his biography, be traced to the development from instincts, first of a sentiment, and later of a master passion, for mathematics.

It does not therefore seem to the reviewer that Professor Woodworth is successful in showing that "native capacities," if such exist at all, are capable of controlling human conduct and character in independence of the instincts. On the contrary, if such "native capacities" do exist, they must become incorporated in the modes of behavior which are integral to instincts and sentiments. But to what extent do such "native capacities" exist? Professor Woodworth nowhere attempts to make a list of them. To do so, he says, would be of little profit, for it would simply be ''to enumerate the various occupations of mankind'' (p. 60). They are not, however, he tells us, differences in talent for abstract mental activities such as reasoning, imagination, and memory, in which men do not differ so much as in the class of subject-matter in which they excel (pp. 60, 75). In one passage they appear to be differences in interest and adaptability to certain objective features of the environment—''color, form, tone, spatial arrangement, mechanical effect, plants, animals, human beings'' (pp. 75, ff.). It must, I suppose, be conceded that there are differences in native ability to discriminate pitch, and make other adaptations to the environment. Some activities in life, no doubt, have as prerequisites an unusual amount of native ability to make specific adaptations of this sort. Perhaps experimental work in ''vocational analysis'' in the future will establish quite a number of such instances. But there is no warrant for supposing that any activity to which a person's attention might be called, and for which he has a natural knack, could become the dominant interest in his life, unless it became the object of a sentiment, capable of enlisting the principal primary instincts in its support. So far as such natural gifts exist they must, like the instincts themselves, be to some extent general, and capable of expression in a variety of activities. For, suppose the attention of one of two brothers were early in life to be attracted to a business opening in the manufacture of hats, and another to an opening in a shoe factory, and each brother became a great captain of industry. Should we not have to assume that the two men probably did not differ greatly in their native capacities, and that either would have succeeded if he had started in the calling chosen by the other? Otherwise, the number of possible ''native capacities'' would be infinite, and inclusive of every human activity in which people differ in ability, from singing and salesmanship to lawn tennis and bridge whist, and in that case even the Lamarckian theory of the transmission of acquired characters could not suffice to account for the diverse elements attributed to human native equipment!

To charge an interest in the novel, as McDougall does, to a general instinct called ''curiosity'' the author thinks is to miss the point. ''Curiosity'' is simply ''a collective name for an indefinite number of impulses, each of which is dependent on the existence of some degree of ability to perceive and understand a certain object'' (p. 103). Here, one suspects, the author has been misled by Thorndike, whose conception of instincts as specific reactions to specific stimuli has led him to split up the comparatively few principal primary instincts into an almost infinite host of mechanisms. But Drever (*Instinct* *in Man,* Chap. VII., Cambridge, 1917) has effectively answered Thorndike in behalf of McDougall on this issue, and Hocking (*Human Nature, and its Remaking,* Chaps. X., XI., New Haven, 1918) has given a better explanation of "curiosity" as a kind of process in which stimulus and response are both primarily central. Personally, I am still disposed to believe that men, like animals, delight to watch whatever is novel in their perceptual experience, that this became the source of reverie, and that scientific interest, going as it does beyond practical needs and the promptings of other instincts, is a further development of this same instinct of curiosity (this JOURNAL, Vol. X., pp. 653 ff.).

A more justified criticism of McDougall appears in the discussion of social behavior (pp. 188–206). Group activity has for man an attractiveness of its own, not covered by McDougall's "gregarious instinct" (which he makes a mere tendency to herd). McDougall has failed to perceive this, and so he makes little reference to comradeship and other relations between equals. So he has little to say of justice, which evolved chiefly by fair play among equals, rather than by domination and submission. Here it must be conceded that there is an omission in McDougall's account of the native equipment of man. But it is by no means necessary to adopt the author's doctrine of "native capacities" in order to remove it. In an account of the psychology of punitive justice, some years ago (*Philosophical Review,* November, 1911) I sought to overcome this difficulty by giving wider scope to the "gregarious instinct." Professor Graham Wallas, in the *Great Society,* suggests that there may be a slight native propensity to love felt between fellow members of the same species generally (pp. 142, ff.). Probably it would be wiser to reserve the term "love" for the sentiment, and to call this native propensity the "social instinct." In any event, Professor Woodworth's objection can be successfully met, either by widening the scope of one or more of the instincts in McDougall's list, or by adding another to them. In the light of Hocking's classification on different planes, this added instinct could belong to the same general non-specific type as "curiosity."

While therefore, the undersigned can not declare himself a convert to the doctrines of "mechanism," "drive" and "native capacity" in preference to the simpler and less mechanistic conceptions of McDougall, he has found this book stimulating and suggestive. It provokes thought on fundamental principles, and it is bound to contribute much to make social psychology *dynamic* in the best sense of the word.

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